India moves yet closer to another milestone military acquisition as an Acceptance of Necessity has been issued by India’s Ministry of Defence through the Defence Acquisition Council. The procurement of 114 multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) has now been approved. This represents one of the largest fighter jet acquisition programs by a foreign customer in recent history.
Although ambiguity has been maintained by the Indian Air Force regarding the final selection of aircraft by official statements, the press release issued by PIB Delhi on 12 February 2026 specifically mentioned Rafale as the multirole fighter aircraft approved in principle.
Objective of MRFA program
The primary objective of the MRFA program is to enhance India’s ability to conduct dominance operations across the full spectrum of modern conflict and to improve deterrence through long-range offensive strike capability. Of the 114 aircraft, approximately 90 are planned to be manufactured in India, while 24 will be imported from France. The imported batch is believed to be built to the F5 standard, with the remaining aircraft produced to the F4 standard, both offering upgrade pathways in the near future.
The roots of this tender trace back to 2018, following the original Medium Multi-role Combat aircraft( MMRCA ) program launched in 2007 for 126 aircraft. The current MRFA process formally restarted in April 2019 with the issuance of an RFI. As a result, nearly eight years have elapsed to reach this stage, during which the IAF’s squadron strength has declined to about 29 against a sanctioned strength of 42.
Unverified reports also suggest that additional aircraft for the Indian Navy may be embedded in this order either five extra jets added to the existing naval requirement or as many as 31 additional aircraft, potentially bringing the total fleet to around 145.
Growing problems
Even the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons is now considered inadequate. Several legacy fleets including six Jaguar squadrons, three MiG-29 squadrons, and three Mirage 2000 squadrons are expected to retire in the coming years. This highlights a persistent structural weakness in India’s air power planning: long-term dependence on foreign OEMs, coupled with delays in indigenous programs.
During the upcoming visit of French President Emmanuel Macron, an MoU is expected to be signed. However, this will not constitute a final contract. Following AON, several procedural steps remain: issuance of a formal Request for Proposal, submission of commercial and technical bids, negotiations on pricing, delivery schedules, offsets, and localisation, conversion into a contractual framework, and final approval by the Cabinet Committee on Security. Indigenisation remains the central sticking point.
Too late or a real power move?
The answer lies somewhere in between. This is best described as a desperate but necessary catchup move.
The acquisition of additional Rafale aircraft, including the Rafale-M naval variant, represents a meaningful enhancement of near-term combat capability rather than a symbolic gesture. While delayed modernization is evident, the operational impact will be immediate. The move simultaneously addresses declining squadron strength and signals deterrence to regional rivals as China and Pakistan continue to modernize.
Deliveries are expected to begin around 2028 for the naval variant and 2029–2030 for the Air Force timelines that coincide with the Indian Tejas Mk2 program, raising concerns that domestic development may be affected. This overlap has fueled domestic criticism as the government’s theme of self-sufficiency seems more of an imported assembly than actual R&D to fill Make In India Quota. India previously procured 36 Rafales as an emergency measure to plug capability gaps. That purchase was driven by delays in indigenous programs and shrinking squadron numbers. The present acquisition expands both land-based and carrier-borne strike capability amid rapid Chinese military expansion along the LAC, accelerated modernization of Pakistan’s Air Force, and intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Operationally, Rafales offer high readiness, advanced sensors, long-range precision strike, and proven electronic warfare. Their integration into existing infrastructure improves availability as fleet size grows.
Two and a Half Front Reality
India increasingly faces a potential two and half front scenario involving China, Pakistan, and regional instability to the east. Additional Rafales enhance flexibility by enabling simultaneous force allocation across multiple fronts, faster redeployment, and deeper standoff strikes without heavy forward basing. However, the deeper issue remains structural fighting across two and a half fronts, which stresses fleet size, ISR coverage, logistics, and industrial endurance. Rafale improves short term flexibility, but only expanded production scale, integrated sensor networks, and supply chain sovereignty determine whether India can sustain pressure across all three directions.
Geopolitical Dimension
The expanded Rafale purchase reflects closer strategic alignment with France, valued for its willingness to supply advanced systems with fewer political conditions and greater technology transfer flexibility. This fits India’s multi vector foreign policy, positioning France as a “capability partner” and having no strings attached relationship to avoid constraints on capability and usage.
The move also reduces dependence on the United States, amid engine delays and uncertainty over future deals, and mitigates exposure to geopolitical volatility such as sanctions risks associated with Russian platforms.
“Too Late” Critics’ Perspectives
Defense critics argue the Rafale expansion merely reacts to a 15 year old force structure deficit and fails to meaningfully counter China’s systemic military growth. From ThePrint, Ajay Ahlawat, a retired IAF fighter pilot, points out that while India struggled with procurement delays and lack of indigenous platform production, China inducted fifth-generation fighters, expanded Tibetan airbases, built dense ISR networks, and refined joint kill chains. Pakistan, meanwhile, has improved operational experience and integrated newer platforms.The core limitations are structural: Effects on domestic programs,Sustainability,Fill rate vs depletion rate,quantity and quality differences,capability. China has the upper hand in every one of these areas while India lags behind even with acquired rafale imports.
According to TheWire,This whole MMRCA to MRFA process is a vastly expensive return to the starting block that merited scrutiny rather than hysterical celebration with lost oportunity for domestic industry and technology accquisition with lack of clarity and transparency from ministry of defense side.
Thus, Rafale serves mainly as a bridging solution while India develops indigenous platforms such as Tejas Mk2 and AMCA. The real danger is strategic complacency, relying on imports to solve short term crises while domestic timelines slip.
Conclusion
The Rafale expansion is too late for long term force planning, but not too late for near term deterrence.It significantly strengthens India’s immediate combat posture and raises the cost of limited conflict. However, it does not alter the fundamental asymmetry with China, rooted in scale, sensor integration, and industrial depth.
Ultimately, Rafale buys India time.
What matters now is whether that time is used to build production capacity, integrated ISR networks, and strategic autonomy or merely to prepare for the next emergency procurement.In that sense, this is not a true power move.
It is a catch up move.